McConnell v. Federal Election Commission: The Supreme Court Rewrites the Book on Campaign Finance Law. Will Political Speech Survive the Most Recent Onslaught? by Holloway, Brendan T.
MCCONNELL V. FEDERAL ELECTION
COMMISSION: THE SUPREME COURT
REWRITES THE BOOK ON CAMPAIGN
FINANCE LAW. WILL POLITICAL SPEECH
SURVIVE THIS MOST RECENT
ONSLAUGHT?
Brendan T. Holloway
1. INTRODUCTION
On a chilly spring morning in the Oval Office, and without the fanfare
typical of major legislative enactments, President Bush put his pen to a bill that
he acknowledged contained "serious constitutional concerns."' The McCain-
Feingold legislation was the culmination of six years of congressional
wrangling to produce fairer campaign finance laws, aimed at banning so-called
"soft money" from the national parties.' In the end, the law did more harm
than good. Why would the President sign a bill he knew would limit the free
speech of the national parties and the American people? Why would members
of Congress limit the funding of their parties and impair their abilities to run
effective campaigns? The answers to these questions depend on who you ask
and when you ask them. In the world of campaign finance reform, success is
measured not by the virtue of a particular reform, but by the perverse indicator
of the level of money and speech that reform curtails. McCain-Feingold
represents an example of one such reform.
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 20023 ("BCRA", "the Act", or
Mike Allen, Bush Signs Campaign Bill, Hits Road to Raise Money, WASH. POST, Mar.
28, 2002, at Al.
2 See id.
3 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified
as 2 U.S.C.A. §§431, 434, 441a, 441i, and 47 U.S.C. §315(e) (2000)) [hereinafter BCRA].
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"McCain-Feingold") was passed by Congress and signed into law by President
Bush on March 27, 2002, with the intent of curbing the influence of special
interest groups in politics.' Title I of BCRA, inter alia, eliminated the
donations of so-called "soft money" or unregulated large contributions to the
national parties.' Title II restricted the broadcasting of so-called "issue ads"
funded by soft money thirty days prior to a primary election and sixty days
prior to a general election.6 The Supreme Court sustained that provision as
well.' Soft money and issue advocacy are two sides of the same First
Amendment coin. As one commentator has explained, "[i]ssue ads are
advertisements which fall outside the contribution and expenditure limits of
[BCRA] because they stop short of expressly advocating the election or defeat
of any particular candidate."8 Issue ads are funded by soft money from special
interest groups to promote a certain cause. By providing a public forum to
groups, these advertisements add to the nation's political speech.' Because
Even though BCRA was signed on March 27, it did not become effective until November 6,
2002, the day after that year's congressional elections.
4 Charles Lane, Rehnquist May Be Keyfor Campaign Finance, WASH. POST, Aug. 31,
2003, at A6. See generally Bradley A. Smith, Soft Money. Hard Realities: The Constitu-
tional Prohibition on a Soft Money Ban, 24 J. LEGIS. 179, 182 (1998) (explaining the back-
ground history on soft money).
5 2 U.S.C. §441i (2000).
(1) A national committee of a political party (including a national congressional cam-
paign committee of a political party) may not solicit, receive, or direct to another per-
son a contribution, donation, or transfer of funds or any other thing of value, or spend
any funds, that are not subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting require-
ments of this Act.
(2) The prohibition established by paragraph (1) applies to any such national commit-
tee, any officer or agent acting on behalf of such a national committee, and any entity
that is directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained, or controlled by such a
national committee.
Id. §441 i (a)(1)-(2).
6 See 2 U.S.C. §434 (2000). Stating in relevant part:
"[E]lectioneering communications" which is defined broadly to encompass any
"broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that (I) refers to a clearly identified can-
didate for Federal office; (11) is made within--(aa) 60 days before a general, special, or
runoff election for the office sought by the candidate; or (bb) 30 days before a primary
or preference election, or a convention or caucus of a political party that has authority
to nominate a candidate, for the office sought by the candidate; and (III) in the case of a
communication which refers to a candidate other than President or Vice President, is
targeted to the relevant electorate."
Id. §434(f)(3)(A)(i)(1)-(lll).
7 McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 650 (2003) (stating that the statute was strictly
construed to allow soft money to be used in issue ads only).
8 See Smith, supra note 4, at 182.
9 See Jonathon S. Krasno and Frank J. Sorauf, Report: Evaluating the Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act of 2003(BCRA), 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 121, 155 (2003) (not-
ing that "[i]ssue advocates may even rename themselves; so, in 2000 the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers Association became 'Citizens for Better Medicare' and two
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these issue ads are funded by unregulated soft money, interest groups use them
as a means to circumvent campaign finance laws as interpreted in the landmark
case of Buckley v. Valeo.' ° Issue ads are also important because they are the
predominant mode of expression of single-issue interest groups, which have
assumed a greater role following the decision in McConnell v. FEC.'
Soft money consists of unregulated donations by large corporations, labor
unions, and wealthy individuals which are given to state, local, and national
parties to be ultimately distributed to their candidates' campaigns. Such
donations are also used by the parties for administrative and day-to-day
expenses. 2 In the 2002 election cycle, the ten largest contributors to each
major party donated 70% of their money as soft money and the remaining 30%
came from a combination of political action committees ("PACs") and
individual contributors, both of which are statutorily regulated. 3 McCain-
Feingold categorically forbids soft money donations, requiring all political
contributions to be made in the form of regulated hard money. 4
The First Amendment of the Constitution provides that "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech . . ."" In Buckley, the
Supreme Court reviewed congressionally imposed contribution and
expenditure limits to determine if they restricted the ability of individuals and
public officials to engage in protected political speech. 6 The Buckley court
held that the only justification for infringing upon political speech is the
prevention of "corruption and the appearance of corruption" in the political
process. 7 The Court ruled that the prevention of corruption did not justify
limits on campaign expenditures by candidates and thus were unconstitutional
brothers from Texas became 'Republicans for Clean Air,' organizations that sound more
impressive and credible than their true sponsors.").
10 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
1 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003) (allowing soft money to be used in issue ads).
12 Id. at 648-49. See generally Jason P. Conti, The Forgotten Few: Campaign Finance
Reform and its Impact on Minority and Female Candidates, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 99,
130 (2002) (describing how soft money helped revitalize state political parties).
13 See, e.g., Center for Responsive Politics, The Money Behind the Elections, at
http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/topcontribs.asp?Bkdn=Source&Cycle=2002 (last
visited Nov. 5, 2004).
14 See Eric L. Richards, Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Committee: Implications for Parties, Corporate Political Dialogue, and Cam-
paign Finance Reform, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 83, 87 (2002) (defining hard money as funds which
fall within BCRA's regulatory ambit such as contributions to federal candidates, PACs, and
political parties as well as expenditures that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a
candidate for federal office).
15 U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
16 Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding that the law did not violate free speech except
when the candidate was restricted from contributing on their own behalf).
17 Id. at 25.
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because they impeded people's ability to engage in protected political
expression." The Court did, however, state that the prevention of corruption
was sufficient to justify contribution limitations (including a $1,000 limitation
per candidate per election) without significantly restricting the peoples' or the
candidates' abilities to engage in political speech.' 9 Thus, the Court fashioned
the precedent that it adheres to today; that campaign contribution limits are less
of a burden on free speech than expenditure limits and therefore, as long as
they are created to stem corruption or the appearance of corruption, they are
constitutional infringements on free speech."
The Court errs in McConnell by applying the Buckley standard to BCRA.
The soft money prohibition in BCRA has far broader implications than the
$1,000 individual contribution limitation in Buckley, yet the Court looks at the
restrictions using the same standard of review.2' Because soft money goes to
the major parties' committees, prohibiting it substantially reduces the funding
of the parties, thereby reducing their ability to engage in party-building
activities that enhance the nation's political speech. In addition, restricting
contributions to the parties diminishes their ability to engage in political
speech, which diminishes their role as the consensus builders of American
politics. Because the Court upheld the soft money prohibition of BCRA, new
groups are being formed to circumvent the law by channeling soft money
contributions to candidates, which was previously the role of the parties." By
taking away the power of the parties, not only will their political speech be
limited, but also the right of individuals to engage in protected political speech
will be limited. People wanting to express their political choices will be forced
to do it through extreme, single-issue oriented groups rather than through the
inclusive national parties.23
18 Id. at 39-59.
'9 Id. at 23-38.
20 Id.
21 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 2 1. The Court in Buckley stated:
A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or campaign or-
ganization thus involves little direct restraint on his political communication, for it
permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in
any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues.
Id.; see also McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 655 ("In Buckley and subsequent cases, we have sub-
jected restrictions on campaign expenditures to closer scrutiny than limits on campaign con-
tributions... In these cases we have recognized that contribution limits, unlike limits on
expenditures, 'entai[l] only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in
free communication."')
22 See, e.g., Thomas B. Edsall, Democrats' Financing Plan Challenged; Watchdog
Groups File Complaint With FEC Over Party's 'Soft Money' Network, WASH. POST., Jan.
16, 2004, at A4.
23 See, e.g., Matthew Cooper and Karen Tumulty, Bring On the Cash, TIME, Feb. 23,
2004, at 18.
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This Note will begin by examining the Supreme Court's prior jurisprudence
in the murky area of campaign finance law. From Buckley to McConnell, the
Supreme Court has tried to explain the discrepancies in its campaign finance
decisions under the broad justification of attempting to diminish the corruption
in the political process. Next, this Note will examine the majority and
dissenting opinions in McConnell and explain how the slim majority wrongly
reasoned that a limitation on campaign contributions is a constitutional trespass
into protected political speech under the First Amendment. Finally, this Note
will examine the post-McConnell impact on the major parties and the effect of
the soft money ban on the ability of the parties and individuals to engage in
protected political speech. This Note will conclude that despite the Supreme
Court's best efforts to curb the omnipresent corruption in the political process,
it has only shifted the weight of political speech from the people and the
parties to single-issue interest groups that now wield greater power by
replacing the parties as repositories for unregulated soft money.
II. FROM BUCKLEY TO MCCONNELL: THE COURT'S QUEST TO
PREVENT CORRUPTION BY LIMITING SPEECH
A. Buckley: The Court Leaves the Door Open for Soft Money
The seminal Supreme Court decision on modem campaign finance reform is
the 1976 case, Buckley v. Valeo.24 The case was brought by diverse groups
including a sitting senator, an ex-presidential candidate, and interest groups
spanning both sides of the political spectrum.2" At issue in Buckley was the
constitutionality of contribution and expenditure limitations set forth in the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 ("FECA") and its 1974 amendments. 6
24 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
25 Id. at 7-8, 9, n.5. Some of the more famous plaintiffs included James Buckley,
Eugene McCarthy, The American Conservative Union, and Common Cause. Some com-
mentators question the justifiability issue, dismissed by the Court, of whether these plaintiffs
were directly affected by the statute. Id. See generally Roland S. Homet, Jr., Fact-Finding in
First Amendment Litigation: The Case of Campaign Finance Reform, 21 OKLA. CITY U.L.
REV. 97, 103 (1996) (discussing the standing issues in Buckley).
26 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 12. The Court further explained that:
[T]he statutes at issue summarized in broad terms, contain the following provisions:
(8)(a) individual political contributions are limited to $1,000 to any single candidate
per election, with an overall annual limitation of $ 25,000 by any contributor; inde-
pendent expenditures by individuals and groups "relative to a clearly identified candi-
date" are limited to $1,000 a year; campaign spending by candidates for various federal
offices and spending for national conventions by political parties are subject to pre-
scribed limits; (b) contributions and expenditures above certain threshold levels must
2004]
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The Court, in a per curiam decision, upheld the congressionally imposed
limitations from individuals to candidates of $1,000 a year and not more than
$25,000 per election, and limited contributions from PACs to candidates of
$25,000 per year.2' The Court did not address the constitutionality of money
that fell outside the regulatory restrictions of FECA, otherwise known as soft
money." Absent a constitutional justification, the Court's decision to uphold
these dollar limits would be an arbitrary and capricious exercise of power.
Therefore, as its only justification for upholding these limits, the Court asserted
that the government has a legitimate government interest in preventing
corruption and the appearance of corruption of the political process, which it
defined broadly to include improper influence and opportunities for abuse, as
well as quidpro quo arrangements. 9
However, in the case of soft money, this corruption rationale cannot be
analogously applied. There cannot be corruption or quid pro quo
arrangements, as the majority in Buckley envisioned them, between a national
party (the initial recipient of the soft money) and one of its candidates (who
receives soft money from the party) who because of their similar party
affiliations, will have the same interest. Inevitably, a candidate and a party
will clash on certain issues and the party is free to deny them funding as a
result. Senator John McCain's 2000 White House bid is a prime example."
Despite such rarities, the quid pro quo corruption justification of Buckley is
inapplicable to soft money because the contributions are not going directly to
candidates but must first go through the party. The restrictions in FECA that
be reported and publicly disclosed; (c) a system for public funding of Presidential cam-
paign activities is established by Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Code; ... and (d) a
Federal Election Commission is established to administer and enforce the legislation.
Id. at 7.
27 Id. at 58-59.
28 See generally James Weinstein, Campaign Finance Reform And The First Amend-
ment: An Introduction, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1068 (2002) (discussing the effect of FEC
Advisory Op. 1978-10 in creating the so-called "soft-money loophole").
29 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27-28.
[T]o the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quidpro quo from
current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative de-
mocracy is undermined ... Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro
quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public
awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual finan-
cial contributions... Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the
appearance of improper influence 'is also critical ... if confidence in the system of rep-
resentative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.'
Id. at 27 (quoting Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)).
30 See generally Trevor Potter and Marianne H. Viray, Election Reform: A Barrier to
Participation, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 547, 555 (2003) (noting that "GOP primary ballot re-
quirements were crafted to severely burden candidates like Senator McCain from participat-
ing and his supporters from exercising their First Amendment right to vote.").
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were upheld in Buckley referred to contributions made directly to candidates
and not to national parties because at the time of the decision, national parties
were not conduits of soft money." Because of the differences in the laws at
issue, it is wrong for the majority in McConnell to so strongly rely on Buckley
to support the soft money ban.
Buckley and its progeny establish that because of the importance of reducing
corruption in the political process, campaign contribution limits deserve to be
reviewed under the less demanding "closely drawn scrutiny" rather than "strict
scrutiny," the standard normally reserved for infringements on free speech.32
The Court cited its precedent that "[n]either the right to associate nor the right
to participate in political activities is absolute,"33 and "[e]ven a 'significant
interference with protected rights of political association' may be sustained if
the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means
closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms."34
Under this lower standard, the Court had no problem justifying the
contribution limitations as reasonable interferences with free speech in order to
prevent further corruption of the political process.35 However, many members
of the current Court have rightly raised doubts whether this lowered standard is
still applicable in the area of campaign finance reform and, to its credit, the
Court's majority in McConnell concedes that.36
Buckley established that the FECA restrictions and its subsequent
amendments were constitutional. 7 On the heels of that decision, in a 1978
advisory opinion, the Federal Election Commission ("FEC") further paved the
31 See Richard Briffault, Symposium: Law and Political Parties: The Political Parties
and Campaign Finance Reform, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 620, 629 (2000) (noting that soft
money totals in 1980, four years after Buckley, were just $19 million, compared with over
$400 million raised in the 2000 election). See also Center for Responsive Politics, at
http://www.opensecrets.org/payback/issue.asp?issueid=CFR&CongNo=107 (last modified
Jan. 9, 2003).
32 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21 (noting that unlike restrictions on campaign expenditures,
contribution limits "entail only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to en-
gage in free communication."); see also FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197,
208 (1982) (discussing the relation between this decreased standard of review and the im-
portance "[b]oth the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and the
eroding of public confidence in the electoral process through the appearance of corrup-
tion.").
33 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (quoting CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973)).
34 Id. (quoting Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 488 (1975); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
35 Id. at 28.
36 See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 405-410 (2000) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 635-644
(1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
37 See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended, codified at 2 U.S.C. §§431-
455.
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way for soft money contributions by introducing a narrow exception to the
hard money requirements of FECA.38 The advisory opinion's ruling allowed
national political parties to accept some unregulated money, i.e., money that
fell outside the scope of FECA, for party-building purposes and get-out-the-
vote ("GOTV") drives that benefited both state and federal elections. 9 At the
same time, the parties were only allowed to allocate hard money for election
purposes that were strictly for federal candidates.4" That FEC opinion stood as
the last interpretation on the legality of soft money's role in political speech for
over twenty years.
B. Shrink Missouri: The Supremes Reveal Their True Intentions
Buckley stood as the most important interpretation of campaign finance law
until 2000. In that year, the Court handed down Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PA C,42 in which a Missouri statute limiting contributions to
candidates for state office,43 including a $1,000 ceiling for statewide offices,
was held to be a constitutional limit on free speech.4 In Shrink Missouri, a
PAC and a state candidate seeking its donations filed suit against the state of
Missouri on the grounds that the law limiting contributions violated their First
Amendment free speech and associational rights.45 On the surface, this holding
implied an acceptance of the principle laid down in Buckley, that in order to
stem the spread or appearance of corruption, limitations on contributions are
constitutionally permissible.46
38 FEC Advisory Op. 1978-10 (1978), at http://hemdon3.sdrdc.com/ao/ao/780010.html
(last visited Nov. 30, 2004). The questions the FEC answered in this advisory opinion were:
(1) Is a voter registration drive allocable as a contribution to a candidate? (2) If a get-
out-the-vote effort contacts voters on behalf of non-Federal candidates only, do the ex-
penses of this effort have to be paid for from a Federal account? (3) If a partof such an
effort is in behalf of Federal candidates, does the entire cost have to be paid from a
Federal committee?
Id.
39 Id.
40 See Weinstein, supra note 28, at 1068.
41 See, e.g., Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 377; Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm.
v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S.
431 (2000).
42 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
43 MO. REV. STAT. §130.032.1(1) (2003) (stating in relevant part that "to elect an indi-
vidual to the office of governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, state treasurer, state
auditor or attorney general, [the amount of contributions made by or accepted from any per-
son other than the candidate in any one election shall not exceed] one thousand dollars").
44 Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 385.
45 Id. at 383.
46 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 ("[T]he primary interest served by the limitations and, indeed,
by the Act as a whole, is the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption
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The Court made a damaging concession, however, when it discussed the
effects of contribution limits on interfering with the ability of a candidate to
finance campaigns. The Court noted that an extreme restriction on
contributions would be unconstitutional if "the contribution limitation was so
radical in effect as to render political association ineffective, drive the sound of
a candidate's voice below the level of notice, and render contributions
pointless."47 The Court then rightly pointed out that the Missouri statute did
not come close to meeting this bar by emphasizing that the overwhelming
majority of contributions in that state's most recent election were of the
statutory permissible amount, meaning that the candidates were not overly
burdened by the restrictions.48
Similar reasoning in McConnell would prove disastrous to the majority's
holding because, unlike the fact situation in Shrink Missouri, a great deal of the
money that Democrats and Republicans raised prior to the enactment of BCRA
came in the form of soft money, i.e., the contributions banned by BCRA.49 The
major parties used soft money to facilitate their speech in a variety of forms,
from GOTV drives, to establishing the parties' platforms and organizing the
national conventions, to engaging in public policy debates in the media with
the other parties." If, as Shrink Missouri states, an important measure of
constitutionality of contribution limitations is the degree to which candidates
rely on a certain form of contribution, a ban on soft money today would not be
a constitutional limitation on free speech because the national parties rely on
soft money for nearly half of their contributions." As will be discussed, the
McConnell majority ignored the rationale it gave in Shrink Missouri and
curtailed the right of the parties to engage in the forms of political speech to
which they had traditionally been permitted.
spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions on can-
didates' positions and on their actions if elected to office.").
47 Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 397.
48 Id. at 395-96.
49 See, e.g., Center for Responsive Politics, at http://www.opensecrets.org/soft-
money/softglance.asp (last visited Nov. 7, 2004) [hereinafter Center for Responsive Politics]
(illustrating that in 2001, 54% of the Democratic and 43% of the Republican Party funds
came from soft money).
50 See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 334-37 (D.D.C. 2003) (Hender-
son, J. dissenting).
51 Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 395-96. Compare Center for Responsive Politics, supra
note 49 (noting that 54% and 43% of the Democratic and Republican party funds respec-
tively came from soft money), with Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26, n.27 ("In 1974 ... 94.9% of the
funds raised by candidates for Congress came from contributions of $1,000 or less.").
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C. Colorado I and H: Who's Corrupting Whom?
Another case after Buckley that shaped the decision in McConnell was
Colorado Republican Fed Campaign Comm. v. FEC (Colorado 1).52 Handed
down in 1996, this decision is important for what it says about the supposed
corrupting influence parties have on candidates, a crucial factor to the Court's
holding in McConnell.3 In its discussion of soft money, the Court in Colorado
I stated, "We are not aware of any special dangers of corruption associated
with political parties.. ."" The Court contradicts itself here when compared to
McConnell, where the soft money ban to the parties was upheld because it
gave the appearance of corruption." How can the Court reconcile its statement
in Colorado I, that fears of corruption of political parties are unfounded, with
its statement in McConnell, that "[S]oft money contributions to national party
committees have a corrupting influence or give rise to the appearance of
corruption.. ?-T6
Colorado I also recognized that FECA, at the time of Buckley, permitted
contributions to the political parties in the amount of $20,000, which was
greatly in excess of contribution limits of $1,000 placed on individuals or
$5,000 placed on PACs." The Court concluded that the "[o]pportunity for
corruption posed by these greater opportunities for contributions [the
contributions of soft money to political parties] is, at best, attenuated." 8 If the
Court's reasoning in Colorado I is carried to its logical conclusion, higher
levels of contributions do not mean greater corruption or opportunity for
52 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
53 Id. at 617-18 ("This fact [the lack of coordination between the candidate and the
party] prevents us from assuming, absent convincing evidence to the contrary, that a limita-
tion on political parties' independent expenditures is necessary to combat a substantial dan-
ger of corruption of the electoral system.").
54 Id. at 616. The Court goes on to say that:
When this Court considered, and held unconstitutional, limits that FECA had set on
certain independent expenditures by PAC's, it reiterated Buckley's observation that 'the
absence of prearrangement and coordination' does not eliminate, but it does help to 'al-
leviate,' any 'danger' that a candidate will understand the expenditure as an effort to
obtain a 'quid pro quo.'
Id. (quoting FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 498 (1985)).
55 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 660 (noting that "the prevention of corruption or its appear-
ance constitutes a sufficiently important interest to justify political contribution limits.").
56 Id. at 661. See also Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v.
Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 299 (1981) (noting that "placing limits on contributions which in
turn limit expenditures plainly impairs freedom of expression.").
57 Colorado 1, 518 U.S. at 616 (citing 2 U.S.C. §441a(a) (West Supp. 2003)). The Court
also points out that "FECA permits unregulated 'soft money' contributions to a party for
certain activities, such as electing candidates for state office, see §431 (8)(A)(i), or for voter
registration and 'get out the vote' drives, see §43 l(8)(B)(xii)." Id
58 Id.
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corruption, but rather enhanced levels of political speech for all citizens.
Again, this holding is completely at odds with the Court's reasoning in
McConnell where the majority relied on corruption, or the appearance thereof,
to justify its soft money ban.59 Ironically, three members of the majority in
McConnell agreed with Colorado l's reasoning, and yet found the soft money
ban of BCRA to be constitutional as a means to prevent corruption or the
appearance of corruption."
Following remand of Colorado I, the Court reheard FEC v. Colorado
Republican Fed Campaign Comm. (Colorado 11) four years later.6 At issue
before the Court was the constitutionality of federal spending limits imposed
on the Colorado Republican Party's expenditures to a candidate.62 The
majority, led by Justice Souter, rejected the Republican Party's statutory
challenge and held that, "a party's coordinated expenditures, unlike
expenditures that are truly independent, may be restricted to minimize
circumvention of contribution limits.
63
The Court's decision is also significant for what it says about political
parties. By holding as it did, Colorado H discerned the role of parties in our
system, and did so in a way that is at odds with the holding of McConnell. The
Court was given a choice between examining parties under a stricter standard
because of their role in political speech, or under a more generous standard
given to other associations. 4 The Court chose to define political parties like
other non-political groups in that they have many roles, not just "electing their
candidates."65 In other words, political parties, since they are similar in form to
any other association, do not deserve any heightened level of scrutiny and
deserve all the protections of free speech and association that the First
Amendment provides. This begs the question to be discussed later, why the
McConnell Court, in upholding soft money restrictions handicapping the
59 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 660.
60 See Colorado 1, 518 U.S. at 616 (opinion of Breyer, J., joined by O'Connor and
Souter, JJ.); Cf McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003) (opinion of Stevens and
O'Connor, JJ, joined by Breyer, J.).
61 533 U.S. 431 (2001).
62 Id. at 437.
63 Id. at 465.
64 See id at 452.
65 Id. The Court continued that some of these roles include:
[C]ombin[ing] its members' power to speak by aggregating contributions and broad-
casting messages more widely than individual contributors generally could afford to
do, and the party marshals this power with greater sophistication than individuals gen-
erally could, using such mechanisms as speech coordinated with a candidate. In other
words, the party is efficient in generating large sums to spend and in pinpointing effec-
tive ways to spend them.
Id at 453.
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power of the parties, reviewed those restrictions under the most exacting
constitutional standard.
1II. THE DECISION IN MCCONNELL V. FEC: ABRIDGING POLITICAL
SPEECH IN THE NAME OF PREVENTING CORRUPTION
A. The Majority Decision: Overlooking the Implications of a Soft Money Ban
In a special session on September 8, 2003, the Supreme Court heard oral
arguments on the constitutionality of the McCain-Feingold legislation from
numerous interest groups and governmental entities.' In a majority opinion
released on December 10, 2003 penned by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, the
Court upheld Title I of BCRA, the cornerstone of which is FECA §323(a), the
soft money ban.67 This provision prohibits national party committees and their
agents from soliciting, receiving, directing, or spending any soft money.68 The
majority also upheld Title II, which contains limitations on issue ads.69 The
majority, dissenting, and concurring opinions fill close to 300 pages and are so
fractured that it is difficult to determine all of the precise holdings." What is
66 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 643, n. 1; see also Lane, supra note 4 (discussing the politi-
cal implications of the decision in McConnell, as well as internal politics of the Court's de-
cision making). A representative group of plaintiffs include members of Congress such as
Mitch McConnell (R-KY), the National Rifle Association, Republican National Committee,
National Right to Life Committee, American Civil Liberties Union, the California Democ-
ratic Party, AFL-CIO, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. See 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 221-
226 (D.D.C. 2003).
67 2 U.S.C. §441i (2000).
68 Id. As the majority says, "In short, §323(a) takes national parties out of the soft-
money business." McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 654.
69 2 U.S.C. §434 (2000).
70 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 642. Stevens and O'Connor, JJ., delivered the opinion of
the Court with respect to BCRA Titles I and II, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.,
joined. Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to BCRA Titles III
and IV, in which O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined, in which Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined except with respect to BCRA §305, and in which Thomas,
J., joined with respect to BCRA §§304, 305, 307, 316, 319, and 403(b). Breyer, J., delivered
the opinion of the Court with respect to BCRA Title V, in which Stevens, O'Connor, Souter,
and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring with respect to BCRA Titles
III and IV., dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I and V, and concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Title II. Thomas, J., filed an opinion
concurring with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, except for BCRA §§311 and 318, con-
curring in the result with respect to BCRA §318, concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part with respect to BCRA Title i, and dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles 1,
V, and §311, in which opinion Scalia, J., joined as to Parts I, II-A, and II-B. Kennedy, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to
BCRA Titles I and II, in which Rehnquist, C. J., joined, in which Scalia, J., joined except to
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clear is that the Court upholds Titles I and I1; the provisions upholding the soft
money ban and issue ad restriction respectively, as constitutional limitations on
protected First Amendment speech.7'
B. The Majority's Analysis: When is Speech Corrupting?
In Buckley and subsequent campaign contribution decisions, the majority
employed a closely-drawn standard of review as opposed to strict scrutiny.72
As its rationale for this lowered standard, the Court explained that contribution
limits "entail only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to
engage in free communication."73 They also stated that the lowered standard of
review is important in preventing the "corruption" and the "appearance of
corruption" that may result through the contributions of large sums.74 This less
exacting standard of review is meant to show a degree of deference to
Congress in an area in which it is thought to have expertise.75
Despite the majority's attempts to cast McConnell in the same mold as
Buckley, the challengers here correctly contended that strict scrutiny should be
employed as the standard because "many of its provisions restrict not only
contributions but also the spending and solicitation of funds raised outside of
the extent the opinion upholds new FECA § 323(e) and BCRA §202, and in which Thomas,
J., joined with respect to BCRA §213. Rehnquist, C. J., filed an opinion dissenting with re-
spect to BCRA Titles I and V, in which Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an
opinion dissenting with respect to BCRA §305, in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ. joined.
Id.
71 Id. at 670. Other challenged provisions of BCRA include: a prohibition on donations
made by minors, Id. at 711; requirement that parties must distinguish between independent
and coordinated expenditures on behalf of its candidates, Id. at 686; requirement that state
parties cannot pay for federal election activities with soft money. Id. at 654-55, 686, 711.
72 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (noting that "even a 'significant interference' with protected
rights of political association may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently im-
portant interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of asso-
ciational freedoms.").73 Id. at 20-2 1.
74 Id.
75 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 656. The Court noted that:
The less rigorous standard of review we have applied to contribution limits (Buckley's
"closely drawn" scrutiny) shows proper deference to Congress' ability to weigh com-
peting constitutional interests in an area in which it enjoys particular expertise. It also
provides Congress with sufficient room to anticipate and respond to concerns about
circumvention of regulations designed to protect the integrity of the political process.
Id. But see Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 410-411 (2000) ("Political
speech is the primary object of First Amendment protection... [t]he Founders sought to
protect the rights ... to engage in political speech ... and that free exchange should receive
the most protection when it matters the most-during campaigns for elective office.")
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
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FECA's contribution limits."76  The majority dispenses with that argument
simply by saying that the soft money ban only limits donations made to
political parties and not amounts spent by political parties." This overlooks
the palpable fact that most of the donations made to political parties are used
for expenditures by the party not only for campaigns, but also for party
building activities and administrative costs."8
Alternatively, the plaintiffs argued that McConnell should be distinguished
from Buckley because "the type of associational burdens that the soft money
ban imposes are fundamentally different from the burdens that accompanied
Buckley's contribution limits, and merit the type of strict scrutiny we have
applied to attempts to regulate the internal processes of political parties."79 The
Court characterized the plaintiffs argument as "greatly exaggerate[d]" and
countered that "[s]ection 323 merely subjects a greater percentage of
contributions to parties and candidates to FECA's source and amount
limitations."8  To characterize the plaintiffs arguments in this manner is an
exaggeration itself. The plaintiffs correctly pointed out that the soft money
restrictions will greatly impede the parties from carrying out their traditional
functions of GOTV drives and party building activities, i.e., functions not
covered under FECA's statutory restrictions.8 The thrust of the plaintiffs
argument is that the restrictions in BCRA, i.e., the soft money ban and issue
advocacy limitation, chip away more at the public's right to engage in political
speech than do the hard money restrictions at stake in Buckley.82 Comparing
the minor hard money restrictions in Buckley ($1,000 from individuals) to the
blanket soft money prohibition in McConnell, the plaintiffs were correct in
76 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 657.
77 Id.
78 See Center for Responsive Politics, at http://www.opensecrets.org/part-
ies/index.asp?type=R&cycle=2002 (last visited Nov. 7, 2004) (showing that of the
$463,312,470 raised by the DNC in 2002, it spent $459,331,677 on that year's congressional
races).
79 Id. at 659. See, e.g., California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 573-574
(2000) ("[W]hen States regulate parties' internal processes they must act within limits im-
posed by the Constitution.").
80 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 659. The Court elaborated:
Buckley has already acknowledged that such limitations "leave the contributor free to
become a member of any political association and to assist personally in the associa-
tion's efforts on behalf of candidates." [citation omitted] The modest impact that §323
has on the ability of committees within a party to associate with each other does not in-
dependently occasion strict scrutiny. None of this is to suggest that the alleged associa-
tional burdens imposed on parties by §323 have no place in the First Amendment
analysis; it is only that we account for them in the application, rather than the choice, of
the appropriate level of scrutiny.
Id.
81 Id. at 657.
82 Id. at 659.
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asserting that a stronger standard of review is demanded.83
Next, the majority argued in McConnell that all BCRA does is place a
greater percentage of party contributions under FECA's limitations, which is
partially true.84 BCRA does more, however, than just limit those soft money
contributions; Title I effectively bans them.85 One indicator of the effect that
the soft money ban will have on limiting political speech can be seen in the
percentage of soft money the parties raised in 2000. The Republican Party and
all of its state committees raised 35% of its contributions, and the Democratic
Party and its state committees raised 47% of all its contributions through soft
money. 6 Thus, by understating the effect of banning these portions of the
parties' revenue, Buckley unwittingly understated the effect BCRA will have
on the two major parties and in the process validated a restriction on political
speech.
C. A Different Beast Altogether: Why Buckley Cannot Be Considered
Precedent in McConnell
The laws banning soft money and restricting issue advocacy in McConnell
are much different than the laws setting contribution limits in Buckley, and
should therefore be treated differently by the Court in McConnell. Title I of
BCRA is much broader than what McConnell claims. It prohibits the national
party committees from "solicit[ing]," "receiv[ing]," "direct[ing] to another
person," and "spend[ing]" any funds, not subject to federal regulation, even if
those funds are used for non-election related activities.87 This means that all
funds received by the national parties, not just funds distributed to the party's
candidates, must come in the form of statutorily regulated hard money. The
majority's logic behind Title I might be more persuasive if the national parties
only acted as middlemen for large donors and federal candidates. However,
like the District Court found, the national parties also contribute to the national
political discourse through other channels including: promoting the political
messages of the parties; increasing public participation in the political process
through get-out-the-vote drives; by nominating and electing candidates; by
engaging in public policy debates; by building coalitions among the extremes
83 Compare Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7, with McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 656.
84 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 659.
85 2 U.S.C. §441i(a)(b) (2000).
86 See Center for Responsive Politics, at http://www.opensecrets.org/parties/total.asp?-
Cmte=RPC&cycle=2000 (last visited Nov. 7, 2004), and
http://www.opensecrets.org/parties/total.asp?Cmte=DPC&cycle=2000 (last visited Nov. 7,
2004).
87 2 U.S.C. §441i(a)(1) (2000).
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in the party; and by helping develop the parties on the state levels.88 And as
Justice Kennedy points out in his dissent to Title I, in addition to the two
national parties, smaller parties exist only for the purpose of generating
debate.89
Besides the national party committees, BCRA even limits the state and local
parties' abilities to engage in political speech. It prohibits state parties from
using soft money for general activities such as voter registration, voter
identification, and GOTV drives for state candidates even if federal candidates
are not mentioned.9 ° It even goes so far as to restrict state and local political
party committees from soliciting or donating "any funds" to any non-profit,
non-political group, regardless of whether the group is seeking to promote an
issue or not.9  Not only are these restrictions overly broad as the plaintiffs
argue, but it is unsupported by the record that they reduce "corruption" or the
"appearance of corruption".92
GOTV drives or the Presidential nominating convention should not be
denied funding on account of their corrupt nature or because they appear so
corrupt that they are inherently suspect. However, that is exactly what the
majority in McConnell says through upholding these soft money prohibitions.93
By banning all soft money to the national, state, and local parties, BCRA
greatly hinders the efforts of the two major parties to carry out their important
functions in politics, other than funneling money to candidates. The majority
justified these broad restrictions by stating that the "close relationship between
federal officeholders and the national parties" makes all donations to the
national parties "suspect."94
88 McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 334-37 (D.D.C. 2003):
[P]olitical parties have played and continue to play at least four critical roles in our
country's political process... First, the parties have coordinated the political activities
and messages of various national, state and local entities within the federal system...
Second, the parties encourage "democratic nationalism" by nominating and electing
candidates and by engaging in discussions about public policy issues of national impor-
tance... For example, the RNC has recently participated in public policy debates re-
garding a balanced budget amendment, welfare reform and education policy.. . Third,
the parties act as critical agents in developing consensus in the United States...
Fourth, the parties cultivate a sense of community and collective responsibility in
American political culture... Parties have been integral in forming a consensus on
such divisive issues as social welfare policy.
Id.
89 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 779 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing the example of the Lib-
ertarian Party).
90 See 2 U.S.C.A. §§441i(b), 431(20)(A)(i)(ii) (West Supp. 2003).
91 See 2 U.S.C. §441i(d) (2000).
92 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
93 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 667-68.
94 Id. at 667.
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By holding that the contribution of soft money to political parties is
inherently corrupting, the Court implied that relationships of political speech
between a party and its candidate are presumptively suspect.95 In reality, the
candidate-party relationship is a model of free speech in politics.96 Just
because a candidate is a member of a party and may accept donations from that
party it should not be presumed that there is corruption. Instead, the candidate-
party relationship should be viewed as a practical vehicle to dispel corruption
in the political process. Group associations should be given more deference by
the current Court and not considered invalid simply because of the nature of
the association. While contributions to political parties should be viewed
objectively, we should heed the words of Chief Justice Rehnquist, who in his
dissent to Title I writes, "[w]ho knows what association will be deemed too
close to federal officeholders next?"
97
D. BCRA's Force Field for Incumbents - The Scalia Perspective
BCRA has been criticized by individuals and groups from both sides of the
political spectrum. A vociferous critic on the McConnell Court is Justice
Scalia, who characterizes the majority's upholding of the soft money
prohibition as "a sad day for the freedom of speech."" His argument against
the majority, however, takes an interesting approach. He persuasively argued
that campaign finance laws in general, and BCRA in particular, tend to
disproportionately favor incumbents at the expense of challengers by making it
harder to gain access to soft money.99 Do you think it is accidental, his
question dripping with derision, that "incumbents raise about three times as
much 'hard money' [i.e., money not restricted by BCRA], as do their
challengers?" '° . .. "Or that lobbyists," who are always seeking the favor of
95 See McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 654-55.
96 See generally Weinstein, supra note 28 (discussing how campaign finance regulation
falls at the intersection of the public discourse and election domains).
97 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 778.
98 Id. at 720 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99 Id. at 721. Scalia continued:
[T]he legislation is evenhanded: It similarly prohibits criticism of the candidates who
oppose Members of Congress in their reelection bid ... If all electioneering were
evenhandedly prohibited, incumbents would have an enormous advantage... In other
words, any restriction.., of campaign speech that is equally available to challengers
and incumbents tends to favor incumbents.
Id. at 720-21.
100 Id. at 721 (citing FEC, 1999-2000 FINANCIAL ACTIVITY OF ALL SENATE AND HOUSE
CAMPAIGNS (JAN. l, 1999-DEC. 31, 2000), at http://www.fec.gov/press/05I -
501congfinact/tables/all-cong2000.xls (all Internet materials as visited Dec. 4, 2003, and
available in Clerk of Court's case file)).
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incumbents, "give 92% of their money in hard contributions?."'"' Perhaps
most persuasively he questions the so-called "millionaire provisions," which
raise the contribution limits for an individual running against someone who
donates great personal wealth to the campaign (as challengers often do), "but
do not raise the limit for a candidate running against an individual who devotes
to the campaign (as incumbents often do) a massive election 'war chest'?"' °0 2
At first glance, these charges seem conspiratorial. It is unlikely that our
elected officials would brazenly plot to solidify their positions by limiting their
challengers' access to contributions. But, an examination of the legislative
history behind McCain-Feingold gives weight to Scalia's arguments.' 3
Besides the "millionaire provisions," there were numerous amendments the
Senate defeated which would have benefited challengers.'" For example, the
Bennett amendment, which would have banned corporations and labor unions
from using their funds to pay the administrative expenses of PACs, a common
vehicle of financing by challengers, was voted down in the Senate. 5 Also, the
Smith amendment, which tried to ban lobbyist and PAC contributions while
Congress was in session, a measure that would have limited incumbents'
fundraising abilities, was similarly voted down.0 6  Ostensibly, these
amendments would have stemmed the appearance of corruption, so important
in Buckley, by making incumbents more beholden to the interests of their
constituents and less to special interests. But Congress declined to adopt these
amendments and as a result produced a bill favoring themselves. Considering
the evidence in the legislative record, Scalia is justified in criticizing BCRA.
The view that BCRA is an example of the inmates running the asylum is not as
far-fetched as it initially sounds.
101 Id. (citing U.S. PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP (PIRG), THE LOBBYIST'S LAST
LAUGH: How K STREET LOBBYISTS WOULD BENEFIT FROM THE MCCAIN-FEINGOLD
CAMPAIGN FINANCE BILL 3, at http://www.pirgorg/democracy/democracy.asp?id2=5068
(July 5, 2001)).
102 Id at 721 ("And is it mere happenstance.., that national-party funding... is more
likely to assist cash-strapped challengers than flush-with-hard-money incumbents?... Was
it unintended.., that incumbents are free personally to receive some soft money and even
to solicit it for other organizations, while national parties are not?"). It is important to note
though that the so-called millionaire provisions were not decided on by the Court because
the plaintiffs lacked standing. See id. at 710.
103 See, e.g., infra notes 105-108.
104 See supra note 102 (discussing Scalia's perspective on the "millionaire provisions").
105 147 CONG. REC. S2550-60 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2001) (Bennett amendment, Senate
Amend. 117).
106 147 CONG. REC. S2561-67 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2001) (Smith amendment, Senate
Amend. 118).
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IV. MCCONNELL: THE BEGINNING OF THE END OF POLITICAL FREE
SPEECH
"This is a modest step, it is a first step, it is an essential step, but it does not even begin to
address, in some ways, the fundamental problems that exist with the hard money aspect of
the system."'
0 7
-Senator Russ Feingold on the implications of BCRA.
Judging by this and other comments made during debate over BCRA,"'0 it
seems that this is just the beginning of campaign finance "reform." The risks
inherent in Congress regulating itself in any area, let alone campaign finance,
should be apparent to even a casual political observer. Having Congressmen
author the laws that govern themselves presents numerous conflicts of interest,
especially when, as with BCRA, the laws are seen as injurious to challengers
and protective of incumbents.' 9 Instead of Congress penning laws governing
themselves, and to prevent Congress from appearing to create laws for their
benefit, more deference should be given to the FEC's rulemaking capacity.
Advisory opinions and rules issued by the politically neutral FEC would be
more credible than politically motivated legislation passed by Congress."'
Opponents argue this would abdicate Congress' legislative function to the
executive branch."' However, the alternative is for Congress to continue
regulating themselves, a situation which will continue producing laws favoring
incumbents at the expense of challengers and the national parties." 2 This may
only be wishful thinking by campaign finance purists, but it should be
considered as a viable alternative to the current system where politics
107 148 CONG. REC. S2096, 2101 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
108 See id. (Statement of Sen. Boxer) ("This bill is not the be-all or the end-all, but it is a
strong start."); Id. (statement of Sen. Corzine) ("This should not and will not be the last
time campaign finance reform is debated on the Senate floor. We have many more impor-
tant campaign finance issues to explore."); Id. at S2157 (Statement of Sen. Torricelli)
("Make [BCRA] the beginning of a reform, not the end of reform.").
109 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 720 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110 By statute, no more than three of the six total commissioners can be of the same
party and the vote of four is needed for any official Commission action. See Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act of 1971 at http://www.fec.gov/about.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2004).
111 See generally Peter S. Guryan, Reconsidering FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund
Through a Bolstered Functionalism, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1338, 1346 (1996) (citing to
Nixon v. Admin. of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)):
"In determining whether the Act disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate
branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the Executive
Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. Only where the po-
tential for disruption is present must we then determine whether that impact is justified
by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Con-
gress."
Id.
112 See supra notes 102-106 (describing Scalia's perspective).
20041
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
supersedes attempts at real reform.
A. Restrictions on Free Speech Must Be Reviewed Under Strict Scrutiny
Normally, restrictions on free speech are reviewed by courts under a strict
scrutiny standard that requires a compelling governmental interest and a
narrowly tailored means to meet that interest."3 By upholding the soft money
ban in McConnell and reviewing BCRA with closely-drawn rather than strict
scrutiny, the Court holds that contributions to political parties are not as
protected as other forms of speech."'
This is at odds with the Court's prior holdings. In Buckley, the Court
observed that, "this Court has never suggested that the dependence of a
communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a
nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First
Amendment.""' 5 In other words, just because money has to be expended to
communicate an idea does not make it fall outside strict scrutiny under which
all restrictions on speech should be reviewed. The Court's majority opinion
dispenses with this rationale and subjects all restrictions on funding of speech
to less exacting scrutiny."6 Justice Scalia underscores this point in his dissent
by suggesting, "Today's cavalier attitude toward regulating the financing of
speech... frustrates the fundamental purpose of the First Amendment."" 7 He
goes on to highlight the realities of political speech in a modem society, i.e.,
that because there are so many actors involved in the dissemination of ideas, a
restriction on an essential actor that prevents ideas from being produced can be
an unconstitutional limitation on free speech."8
13 See, e.g., FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982) (describing
the standard of review for limits on association and speech rights to be "subject to the clos-
est scrutiny") (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 460-61 (1958)).
'14 See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 (describing the expenditure as opposed to the con-
tribution limits at issue as imposing "substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on
the quantity and diversity of political speech.").
115 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16.
116 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 659.
117 Id. at 722.
118 Id. Justice Scalia continued:
In any economy operated on even the most rudimentary principles of division of labor,
effective public communication requires the speaker to make use of the services of oth-
ers. An author may write a novel, but he will seldom publish and distribute it himself.
A freelance reporter may write a story, but he will rarely edit, print, and deliver it to
subscribers. To a government bent on suppressing speech, this mode of organization
presents opportunities: Control any cog in the machine, and you can halt the whole ap-
paratus. License printers, and it matters little whether authors are still free to write.
Restrict the sale of books, and it matters little who prints them.
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As mentioned earlier, three members of the McConnell majority previously
held that the corrupting effect of soft money is "at best, attenuated.""' 9 Even
though the majority premises its arguments on the notion that soft money
contributions corrupt the process, there is very little evidence on the record that
soft money has this effect. 2 As Justice Kennedy wrote in his dissent, "[t]o
reach today's decision, the Court surpasses Buckley's limits and expands
Congress' regulatory power ... replac[ing] discrete and respected First Amen-
dment principles with new, amorphous, and unsound rules, rules which
dismantle basic protections for speech."' 2'
As stated above, Buckley's limitations concerned $1,000 donations to
candidates and $25,000 donations to PACs, and the justification for those
limitations was to prevent "corruption or the appearance of corruption" in the
political process.' 22 The McConnell Court cites this same justification for
upholding the soft money ban. 23 What the majority in McConnell forgets is
the major difference between the hard money restrictions in Buckley and
BCRA's total prohibition of soft money. Buckley was primarily concerned
with the corruption of quid pro quo contributions to candidates,'24 and the
limitations imposed by the Court were narrowly tailored to protect that
119 See Colorado!, 518 U.S. at 616.
120 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 732 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part) (noting that "The evi-
dence cited by the joint opinion does not meet this standard and would barely suffice for
anything more than rational-basis review.").
121 Id. at 742. Justice Kennedy continued:
A few examples show how BCRA reorders speech rights and codifies the Govern-
ment's own preferences for certain speakers. BCRA would have imposed felony pun-
ishment on Ross Perot's 1996 efforts to build the Reform Party. Compare Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) §§309(d)(1)(A), 315(a)(1)(B), and 323(a)(1)
(prohibiting, by up to five years' imprisonment, any individual from giving over
$25,000 annually to a national party) with Spending By Perot, THE HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, Dec. 13, 1996, p. 43 (reporting Perot's $8 million founding contribution to
the Reform Party). BCRA makes it a felony for an environmental group to broadcast an
ad, within 60 days of an election, exhorting the public to protest a Congressman's im-
pending vote to permit logging in national forests. See BCRA §203. BCRA escalates
Congress' discrimination in favor of the speech rights of giant media corporations and
against the speech rights of other corporations, both profit and nonprofit. Compare
BCRA §203, with Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-660
(1990) (first sanctioning this type of discrimination).
McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 742.
122 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26 ("It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary pur-
pose-to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual fi-
nancial contributions-in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000
contribution limitation.").
123 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 656.
124 Id. at 745 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part) ("Buckley made clear.., that the corrup-
tion interest only justifies regulating candidates' and officeholders' receipt of. .. 'quids' in
the quid pro quo formulation.").
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interest. '25
In McConnell, despite the majority's bald assertion that donations to
political parties are inherently suspect,126 there are no quid pro quo dangers
precisely because the political parties are the recipients of the soft money, not
the candidates, as was the case in Buckley.'27 In his dissent, Justice Kennedy
stated, "Buckley's standard, however, was to define undue influence by
reference to the presence of quidpro quo involving the officeholder." '28 In
McConnell, Justice Kennedy continued "that access, without more, proves
influence is undue," and the Court equates access with "actual or apparent
corruption of officeholders."' 29 Attempting to compare the limits in Buckley to
the limits in McConnell, the Court attempted to justify upholding BCRA using
its rationale in Buckley.'30 However, it is a perverse distortion indeed to equate
statutory hard money limits, as in Buckley, to the blanket soft money
prohibition in McConnell.
B. Shifting Free Speech: How McConnell Has Limited Speech By Subduing
the Parties and Creating the 527s
Even though it claims to rely on Buckley as precedent, McConnell goes far
beyond the comparably minor restrictions in Buckley to effectually rearrange
the manner of American political speech. In his oral arguments representing
the challengers, Kenneth Starr argued that BCRA shifts resources and power
away from political parties, which have long been a source of stability for the
nation, and in the direction of politically divisive special interest groups.' It is
no secret that following the passage of BCRA and the McConnell decision,
political parties will lose a large part of their funding.'32 By banning soft
money to political parties, BCRA's own language leaves open non-party
committees and interest groups to continue raising and spending soft money,
while concomitantly restricting the money and speech of the two major
national parties.'33
125 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27 ("To the extent that large contributions are given to se-
cure a political quidpro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our
system of representative democracy is undermined.").
126 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 667.
127 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13.
128 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 746.
129 Id.
130 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 744-45; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-36.
131 See, e.g., Excerpts from the Supreme Court's Arguments, at http://www.ilcampa-
ign.org/press/news/national/articles/9-9-03_Excerpts.html (Sept. 9, 2003) [hereinafter Starr].
132 See, e.g., Center for Responsive Politics, supra note 49.
33 See 2 U.S.C.A. 441i(a)(2) (West Supp. 2003) (stating in relevant part, "[T]he [soft
money] prohibition ... applies to any such national committee, any officer or agent acting
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Prior to the passage of BCRA and the Court's decision in McConnell, the
political parties used large volumes of soft money to finance their activities.'
3 4
What has yet to be determined is the lasting effect of these new restrictions on
the political parties. Prior cases held that parties have significant roles in
promoting and protecting political speech.'35 With the banning of practically
half of the national parties' contributions, a large part of the parties' role is
lessened by diminishing their capacity to engage in political speech.
As Justices Stevens and O'Connor stated in the majority in McConnell,
"[m]oney, like water, will always find an outlet."'36 Thus, it should come as no
surprise that as soon as McConnell was handed down, "shadow parties" began
to emerge as the recipients of the soft money that BCRA banned to the national
parties.'37 Groups such as America Coming Together ("ACT") and Americans
for a Better Country ("ABC") have been stealthily created by party operatives
and funded by wealthy donors to do the same thing national parties do: funnel
money to candidates they support.'38 Named after the Internal Revenue Code
section that allowed for their creation, " 527s have been created mainly by
Democrats, who have always been more dependent on soft money
contributions than Republicans, 4 ° to collect large donations of money banned
by BCRA.' 4' 527s have been around for years, but have only gained notoriety
after the passage of McCain-Feingold' 42 International financier George Soros,
whose political agenda includes a professed desire to beat George W. Bush in
his 2004 reelection at any cost,'43 has already pledged $10 million to these
on behalf of such a national committee, and any entity that is directly or indirectly estab-
lished, financed, maintained, or controlled by such a national committee").
134 See, e.g., Center for Responsive Politics, supra note 49.
135 See Colorado 1, 518 U.S. 604 (1996); Colorado 11, 533 U.S. 431 (2001).
136 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 706.
137 See generally Edsall, supra note 22 ("The shadow party is a network of organiza-
tions established to fill the vacuum created by the McCain-Feingold law's ban on party-
raised 'soft money,' or large contributions from corporations, unions and rich individuals").
138 See id. Essentially, ABC and ACT are conduits of soft money legally organized un-
der §527 of the I.R.C. to allow them tax-exempt status. Id.
139 26 U.S.C §527 (2004).
140 See Center for Responsive Politics, supra note 49.
141 See generally Cooper, supra note 23, at 18 (noting ironically that "Democrats have
spent the past year searching for exemptions in the McCain-Feingold campaign-finance-
reform law that they themselves had long championed.").
142 See generally Gregory Comeau, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 40 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 253, 279 (2003) (noting that "[d]onations to Section 527 nonprofit corporations, and
spending by these corporations, will likely increase as a result of the BCRA.").
143 Laura Blumenfeld, Soros's Deep Pockets vs. Bush; Financier Contributes $5 Million
More in Effort to Oust President, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2003, at A3 (quoting Soros as say-
ing beating Bush is "[t]he central focus of my life," and "America, under Bush is a danger to
the world .... [a]nd I'm willing to put my money where my mouth is.").
20041
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
groups.' Republicans, who have always been better at raising hard money
contributions from a larger base of contributors, hope the 527s activities' will
be severely restricted by the FEC.'45 If 527s are allowed to operate freely by
the FEC, Republicans have vowed to produce more of their own.'46
On February 18, 2004, the FEC ruled in a 4-2 decision that these groups'
raising of soft money may be subject to regulation, but it postponed a decision
on how tough those restrictions should be. 4 7 The ruling, in essence, warned
groups like ACT and ABC that activities that "promote, attack, support, or
oppose" federal candidates must be paid for partly with hard money.'48 Both
Republicans and Democrats predictably claimed the ruling as a victory,'49 but
the FEC's action opened the door to further rulings by leaving many questions
unanswered: What is the allowable ratio of hard money to soft money? Will
527s and similar groups become subject to FEC disclosure regulation?' It is
still unclear how the FEC will rule on these details but for the time being, the
527s are free to collect and spend as they wish. 5'
The creation of 527s highlights one of the main problems in the enactment
of campaign finance laws in general, and BCRA in particular. Campaign
finance enthusiasts irrationally presumed that when soft money contributions
were banned, the corporations and individuals who previously donated such
money would be deterred by the soft money ban and decide to only contribute
hard money in the statutorily regulated amounts. 5 2 The major donors to both
major parties, undeterred by McCain-Feingold, simply redirected their money
144 See Cooper, supra note 23.
145 See Edsall, supra note 22.
146 See Cooper, supra note 23. Frank Donatelli, a former Reagan administration official
has claimed that if the FEC allows 527s to continue the GOP will use them too. "We have to
play... [W]e have no choice in the matter." Id.
147 Thomas B. Edsall, FEC Moves to Regulate Groups Opposing Bush, WASH. POST,
Feb. 19, 2004, at A6.
148 Id.
149 Glen Justice, Advocacy Groups Win Fund Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2004, at Al
(Ed Gillespie, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, noted, "The Federal Elec-
tion Commission should be commended for its campaign finance ruling to uphold the new
law of the land... [T]oday's ruling effectively shuts down illicit 527 groups that operate in
the shadows by using unregulated soft money to influence federal elections."). A spokesman
for America Coming Together stated, "We'll be plowing forward as planned... [I]t's clear
that today's action is limited in its scope. We remain confident that we'll have the room we
need to operate robustly and effectively." Id.
150 See Edsall, supra note 22.
'51 See Justice, supra note 149.
152 148 CONG. REc. S2096, 2100 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Boxer)
(Senator Boxer said in support of BCRA, "No longer will Federal candidates have to go and
ask for unlimited sums of money for our parties and be put in a position where.., it has that
appearance of a conflict of interest.").
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to other outlets, as the majority in McConnell predicted they would.'53
Proponents of McCain-Feingold did not predict how influential these 527s
would be as shadow parties to accomplish the same goal as the parties: to
influence elections by filling the candidate's campaign coffers with
unregulated money.'54
The next logical question is why does it matter that parties are losing their
political speech function at the expense of these 527s? So what if the 527s
take over as the major conduits of soft money rather than the parties? The
problem with 527s is that they are formed (mostly on the left) by the fringes of
the party, particularly with single-issue agendas and often promoting bitterly
partisan agendas.'55 Dozens of these committees have already been created and
their donations total in the millions.'56 Because all of this money is bypassing
the parties, the parties and the public alike are being deprived of the critical
role the major parties play in protecting political speech. Like the District
Court stated in McConnell, parties have many important roles in developing
and protecting the political speech of the country: they nominate and elect
candidates, engage in public policy debates, build coalitions among the
extremes in the party, and help develop the parties on the state levels.'57
Granted, they will still be able to continue some of these functions by using
hard money donations, but by losing nearly half of their funding, it is
impossible to imagine they can continue their strong positions as stabilizers
between the extremes in the parties.
It is axiomatic that candidates depend on contributions for their campaigns
and those same officials frequently vote the way those contributors want. 58
Once candidates start receiving the benefit of 527s, they will feel beholden to
those same groups rather than their party, from where soft money traditionally
came. Not only will this spell a diminished role for national parties, but by
153 McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 706 (2003) (quoting the majority opinion,
"Money, like water, will always find an outlet.").
154 See, e.g., Comeau, supra note 142, at 279.
155 See Blumenfeld, supra note 143 (noting that the people who are running these left-
leaning 527s include former Clinton Chief of Staff, John Podesta, Morton Halperin, a "lib-
eral think-tank veteran", Steve Rosenthal, CEO of ACT, Ellen Malcolm, ACT's President,
and other democratic strategists).
156 See Center for Responsive Politics: 527 Committee Activity, at
http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527cmtes.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2004). Some of the
Democratic 527s include America Coming Together ($12,515,000 raised), Moveon.org
($4,799,433 raised), and the Media Fund ($3,000,000 raised). Id.
157 McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 334-37 (2003).
158 See generally Paul Bender, The Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Legislation:
After Buckley v. Valeo, 34 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1105, 1107 (2002) (noting that, "The Buckley
Court was aware in 1976 that the problem of large campaign contributions corruptly buying
political influence was, in the Court's words, 'not an illusory one."').
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making candidates more dependent on these ideological, single-issue groups,
these same officials will undoubtedly begin pursuing their donor's more
extreme agendas in order to keep their support. Additionally, because 527s are
not subject to the same disclosure requirements as the parties, they can rely on
large individual contributions by wealthy donors; an idea that would have
made the sponsors of BCRA cringe.'59 Also, the party-run system inherently
placed more importance on advocating a range of views and reaching a
common ground.'6 ° Under the new interest group dominated system, there is
no room for dissent and the only ideas encouraged are those pushed by its
members. 6 '
Characteristic of these groups is MoveOn.org, a 527 whose stated mission is
to "encourage greater participation in the democratic process and thus make
government more representative."' 62 MoveOn.org's contributions go solely to
Democratic candidates."'3 Fueled by recent contributions of $5 million from
Soros and friend Peter Lewis, Moveon.org was originally started as an online
petition against the 1998 impeachment of President Bill Clinton and
transformed into a tool for its members to punish those involved in prosecuting
the impeachment."6 Claiming 1.7 million members, it portrays itself on its
website and in various media as a grassroots organization concerned with
"bringing ordinary people back into politics."'65 Even though there is a clear
disconnect with its stated mission and its funding activities, legally
MoveOn.org and other similar groups can collect any amount of money from
whatever source derived.'66 They can then funnel that money to any candidate
159 See 26 U.S.C. §527(a) (2000). Stating in relevant part that:
A political organization which accepts a contribution, or makes an expenditure, for an
exempt function during any calendar year shall file with the Secretary either.., a pre-
election report, which shall be filed not later than the twelfth day before ... any elec-
tion with respect to which the organization makes a contribution or expenditure, and
which shall be complete as of the twentieth day before the election.
Id.
160 McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 335 ("The parties act as critical agents in de-
veloping consensus in the United States... In the words of one defense expert [in the
McConnell case], parties are 'the main coalition building institution[s] ... by a good meas-
ure."). Id.
161 See, e.g., discussion of MoveOn.org, infra note 165 (Moveon.org describes its role as
"build[ing] electronic advocacy groups.").
162 Scott Duke Harris, L.A. TIMES MAGAZINE, Feb. 29, 2004, Part I, at 22.
163 See Center for Responsive Politics, at http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/look-
up2.asp?strid=C00341396&cycle=2004 (last visited Apr. 17, 2004).
164 See Harris, supra note 162 (noting that "Soros and Lewis made a 50% matching gift,
meaning they will contribute $1 for every $2 that MoveOn.org raises.").
165 See, e.g., MoveOn.org, at www.moveon.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2004) (Their
website goes on to say that "MoveOn.org is a catalyst for a new kind of grassroots involve-
ment, supporting busy but concerned citizens in finding their political voice.").
166 See 2 U.S.C. §441i(a)-(b) (2000) (restricting the spending and soliciting of party
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they desire; in this case to liberal Democrats who support their issues, in the
form of television or internet advertising.'67 If this pattern of contributing and
distributing to candidates looks familiar, it should. Before the abolition of soft
money, the national parties did the same thing. Now the only difference is the
group acting as the middleman is not the party but a "razor-sharp" interest
group.
68
MoveOn.org and the other 527s cannot be blamed for what they are doing.
They are simply using existing laws to do what the Constitution allows them to
do: express their free speech and associational rights by organizing a political
group. 69 However, Congress and the FEC should create a legal and political
climate that not only allows the free expression of speech by single-issue
interest groups, but also by the political parties. The alternative to a party-run
democracy is one run by interest groups where parties cease to play their
traditional roles as stabilizers of extremes and forums for debate. The FEC is
expected to rule on the legality of these 527s sometime prior to the election,
but no one is sure what any ruling might say.'7 ° Until then, the 527s are free to
collect and spend as much money as they can and it appears they are doing just
that. 17
V. CONCLUSION
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 was hailed by proponents as
the second coming of Buckley; a set of reforms that would illuminate the
campaign finance landscape and operate as a beacon for future reforms. These
supporters hoped the subsequent decision in McConnell would validate their
legislation by laying down immutable principles of campaign finance law to
guide future decisions. Instead, the majority in McConnell confounded an
already confusing area of First Amendment law by upholding McCain-
Feingold's soft money prohibition and issue ad restrictions over the objections
of Congressmen, interest groups, and the national parties; the same groups
committees). MoveOn.org and other 527s are not considered parties and are not subject to
section 441 i's restrictions. Id.
167 See MoveOn.org, supra note 165. In 2003, these issues included opposition to the
war in Iraq and media reform.
168 See Starr, supra note 131.
169 U.S. CONST. amend 1.
170 Dan Balz and Thomas B. Edsall, Democrats Forming Parallel Campaign; Interest
Groups Draw GOP Fire, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2004, at Al (noting that "the new 527 rules
will not be effective until late July at the earliest").
'71 Id. (noting that "George Soros and his wife.., gave $5 million to ACT and $1.46
million to MoveOn.org; Peter B. Lewis, chief executive of the Progressive Corp ... gave $3
million to ACT and $500,000 to MoveOn.org ... and Linda Pritzker, of the Hyatt hotel
family.., gave $4 million to the joint fundraising committee.").
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their decision claims to protect, all in the name of preventing corruption.
Simply put, the Court erred in applying the Buckley standard to BCRA.
Whereas Buckley upheld minor dollar limitations, the McConnell majority
upholds a blanket prohibition of soft money to the national parties and issue ad
restrictions, both of which significantly limit the power of the people and the
parties to engage in political speech. In Buckley, there was a serious threat of
corruption due to the nature of the quidpro quo contributions at issue, the soft
money at issue in BCRA does not present that same corruption because the
parties' role as middlemen eliminates contributions going directly to the
candidates. In Buckley, the Court reviewed the restrictions on contributions
under closely-drawn scrutiny. Because BCRA restricts more money and
prevents the national parties from carrying out their important roles in
American politics, it should be reviewed under strict scrutiny. At a time when
voter participation is barely 50% of the voting age population,' Congress
should be encouraging greater participation in the political process rather than.
diminishing the roles of the national parties and limiting access to funds for
challengers.
The long-term ramifications of McConnell on free speech remain unclear as
individuals and parties struggle to adjust in its aftermath. The creation of
shadow parties to fill the void of the national parties highlights this dramatic
infringement on free speech and how far the decision goes to rearrange
political speech in America. In essence, the McConnell decision opened a new
loophole while claiming to close another. The statute's own language allows
interest groups, such as 527s, to raise as much soft money as they wish to
influence elections. These soft money contributions often range in the millions
and ironically are the very object that supporters of McCain-Feingold sought to
eliminate.'73 By ruling as it did, the McConnell Court took campaign finance
reform back to square one. Soft money can still be used to support candidates,
now it just has to be contributed to groups like MoveOn.org instead of the
Democratic National Committee. Soft money has found a new home with
these special interest groups and corruption, that oft-cited justification for
infringing upon free speech, is as rampant as ever.
172 See, e.g., FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, VOTER REGISTRATION AND TURNOUT
2000, at http://www.fec.gov/pages/2000tumout/reg&toOO.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2004)
(showing that 51.3% of the voting age population voted in 2000).
173 See Balz and Edsall, supra note 170.
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